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INTRODUCTION
Welfare reform is a hotly debated issue in America. Opponents to
welfare programs argue that recipients, who have no desire to “earn” a
living, abuse a system designed for the neediest of families and engage
in risky behaviors such as premarital sex and drug use. American
taxpayers and politicians have criticized welfare programs such as the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) because welfare
benefits were not tied to work.1 In addition, many welfare recipients
are erroneously characterized as African-Americans,2 drug addicts and
alcoholics,3 or shiftless and unwilling to work.4 Although these
fallacies have been contradicted by research, some recipients may
further perpetuate these stereotypes by remaining on the welfare rolls
for long periods of time and having children out of wedlock.5 In an
effort to reduce the dependence of the poor on welfare, Congress
enacted the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) law.6
TANF was designed to move poor families from “welfare rolls” to
“payrolls” by setting mandatory work requirements7 and time limits
for income assistance.8 However, welfare reform is complicated
because states can require recipients to adhere to behavioral policies
1. See generally PHILIP E. POPPEL & LESLIE H. LEIGHNINGER, SOCIAL WORK, SOCIAL
WELFARE, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 25-56 (1993) (describing such criticisms of AFDC).
2. See Rosalee A. Clawson & Rakuya Trice, Poverty as We Know It: Media
Portrayal of the Poor, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 53, 54 (2000) (reporting that in a study of
news magazines, the media typically portrayed poverty as “black,” although less than
one-third of the poor are black).
3. See Bridget F. Grant & Deborah A. Dawson, Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse
and Dependence Among Welfare Recipients, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1450, 1453
(1996) (finding that the rates of alcoholism and drug use among welfare recipients
were very similar to the national averages).
4. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE
UNDERCLASS 255 (1992) (illustrating that most welfare mothers are willing to work if
they will benefit more from the work than from staying home).
5. See ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, ISSUES IN BRIEF: TEENAGE PREGNANCY AND
THE WELFARE REFORM DEBATE (1995) (asserting that three-fourths of unmarried
adolescent mothers begin receiving welfare within five years of their first child’s birth,
and that teen mothers are disproportionately represented among long-term AFDC
recipients), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ib5.html; see also Diane
Lim Rogers & Alan Weil, Welfare Reform and the Role of Tax Policy, 53 NAT. TAX J.
385, 387 (2000) (arguing for policy changes that would reduce the number of nevermarried mothers on TANF and promote families).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1996) (providing for block grants to states for temporary
assistance to needy families).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1996) (requiring states receiving aid under the program
to establish minimum participation rates per fiscal year of families receiving aid).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (1996) (providing that generally, a state
program funded under the TANF statute shall not use federal funds to provide
assistance for more than five years).
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or risk termination from the program, and states are able to set
restrictions on benefits.9 For example, TANF policy in Mississippi is
problematic because the state ranks among the worst in teenage
pregnancy,10 illiteracy,11 and household income.12
One of the purposes13 of TANF is to “end the dependence of needy
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriages.”14 The purpose of this Article is to review the
literature on welfare reform and TANF, to determine whether or not
TANF’s stated purpose is being met in Mississippi, and to recommend
changes in laws or policies which we believe would help accomplish
TANF’s purpose in Mississippi. First, we present the evolution of
TANF policy from its predecessors, including the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. Second, we discuss the successes and failures of
current federal TANF policy. Third, we critique Mississippi’s TANF
policy in light of the state’s unique economic and social problems.
Finally, we discuss the implications of the current policy and offer
recommendations for the future.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WELFARE REFORM
Welfare, also known as “relief” until the 1950s, has been historically
characterized into four components: (1) relief payments for below
low-wage workers to instill a sense of work-ethic among the poor,
(2) discriminatory practices concerning public aid against people of
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (1996) (giving states broad latitude in creating
eligibility requirements, termination requirements, and type and level of benefits).
10. See Allan Guttmacher Institute, Teenage Pregnancy: Overall Trends and State
by State Information (1999) (finding that Mississippi had the nation’s tenth highest
rate of teen pregnancy), available at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/teen_preg_stats.
html.
11. See Robin L. Flanigan, Mississippi, 2 EDUC. WK. 127 (2002) (stressing the
importance of providing assistance to the poor in Mississippi due to the fact that the
state’s illiteracy rates are among the highest in the country).
12. See US CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME 2001 (2001) (stating that Mississippi ranked
47th in median household income nationwide), available at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/income/income01/statemhi.html.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1996) It was Congress’ intent to:
increase the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to (1)
provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-ofwedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing
and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the
formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
Id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1996). This Article will deal only with the effects
of mandatory work programs on the needs of poor families.
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color and immigrants until the 1950s, (3) stigmatism and
embarrassment of welfare recipients to discourage others from
seeking aid, and (4) proof that recipients are deserving of aid by
demonstrating the ability to find and maintain jobs.15
In the past, the federal government had left the task of providing
assistance to poor, needy, unfortunate, crippled, or elderly persons to
private agencies.16
This stance changed during the Great
Depression.17 Increasing unemployment and poverty rates led
Franklin D. Roosevelt to enact the New Deal Program, a series of
government and welfare programs designed to “temporarily” aid the
unfortunate.18 The Federal Emergency Relief Act (“FERA”) was one
of the first federal welfare programs enacted in 1933.19 FERA, a $500
million grant program to state and local governments, provided relief
funds to all unemployed persons and dependents in need.20 This
marked the first time in American society that relief funds were
available to groups other than widows, orphans, and disabled persons.
In 1935 the Social Security Act was passed by the federal
government, which established the Aid to Dependent Children
Program (“ADC”).21 Like FERA, ADC was created to improve the
living situations of needy families as a unit.22 ADC provided cash
assistance to children of families reliant on or deprived of income
resources due to the absence of a parent because of death, divorce, or
separation.23 ADC laid the foundation for what became known as Aid

15. See Nancy E. Rose, Scapegoating Poor Women: An Analysis of Welfare
Reform, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 143, 144 (2000).
16. See MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL
SOCIETY 35-40 (1996) (describing private charitable programs that supplemented the
minimal assistance that the government provided for the nation’s poorest citizens).
17. See id. at 45 (reporting the dramatic increase in joblessness and poverty
during the Great Depression, and the effect that it had on both charitable
organizations and the government).
18. See id. at 48-50 (discussing several of the welfare and employment programs
enacted by Roosevelt as part of the New Deal).
19. See id. at 49-50 (stating that Roosevelt signed FERA into law just ten weeks
after his inauguration, signaling an important change in federal welfare policy).
20. See id. (discussing the rapid development and implementation of the Federal
Emergency Relief Act).
21. See id. at 49-50 (describing the quiet creation of ADC, which would become
the foundation of the modern welfare system).
22. See SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S
LIFE CHANCES 24 (1997) (stating that the main goal of both ADC and FERA was to
“improve the material well-being of families, not the behavior of the parents”).
23. See id. at 25-26 (asserting that ADC was intended to provide aid to “worthy”
recipients, including children whose mothers were divorced or abandoned). See
generally LOUISE C. JOHNSON & CHARLES L. SCHWARTZ, SOCIAL WELFARE: A RESPONSE TO
HUMAN NEED (1988).
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to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”). From 1938 to 1940,
the number of families on ADC rolls increased substantially.24 AFDC
was intended to provide financial support to families with children
and little or no earned income.25 Poor single mothers had to show
that they did not receive financial support from the father of their
children.26 Although financial support was minimal and provided just
enough benefits for a family to survive, the number of welfare
recipients increased almost every year for sixty years since the
inception of ADC.27
ADC was amended in 1950 to include relatives with whom the child
resided.28 By 1956, the number of ADC families increased to over
600,000 with a total of 2.2 million persons.29 Approximately onefourth of all aid recipients were unwed mothers.30 Because welfare
policies initially targeted only widows with children, many politicians
and the American public had unfavorable views towards the
increasing trend of unwed mothers receiving welfare benefits.31 The
United States experienced nearly a seventeen percent increase of
single parent households headed by women from 1950 to 1960.32
24. See TANNER, supra note 16, at 50 (reporting that in 1938, 243,000 families and
more than 600,000 children participated in ADC, but that by 1939, the numbers had
increased to 298,000 families and 708,000 children).
25. See MAYER, supra note 22, at 25 (quoting the Social Security Board’s
observation that “homes in which dependent children now live do not, in many
instances, conform to a minimum standard of decency and health or provide a
minimum opportunity for a child’s welfare. These conditions frequently result
directly or indirectly from economic pressures . . . and may be eliminated by adequate
assistance and services”).
26. See Philip N. Cohen & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Marriage, Children, and
Women’s Employment: What Do We Know?, 122 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 22, 23 (1999)
(stating that ADC, later AFDC, was intended to enable mothers who had lost the wage
support of fathers to stay out of the labor market and care for their children).
27. See June E. O’Neill & M. Anne Hill, Gaining Ground? Measuring the Impact
of Welfare Reform on Welfare and Work, CENTER FOR CIVIC INNOVATION (July 2001)
(showing a steady increase in the number of families receiving welfare from 1936
until the early 1990s), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/
cr_17.htm.
28. See TANNER, supra note 16, at 51 (noting that ADC was amended to provide
more assistance to the mothers or other relative caretakers).
29. See id. (stating that the number of families receiving ADC reached 2,221,000
people in 1956, despite declining poverty and a strong economy).
30. See id. (stating that 22.7% of ADC recipients were unwed mothers, although
the program was originally intended for widows).
31. See Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of
the Time: 1990’s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 22 (1996) (discussing conservative political attacks on and social
attitudes toward AFDC, a program that was seen by many as benefiting the
“undeserving poor”).
32. See Ellen J. Perkins, AFDC in Review 1936-1962, 5 WELFARE IN REV. 1, 3 (1963)
(noting the significant increase in “such broken families” between 1950 and 1960).
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Single parent households became a growing concern on two fronts: a
moral perspective and a higher dependence on welfare than twoparent families.33
In the middle and late 1960s a number of “Great Society Programs”
were introduced by the Johnson administration.34 These programs
called for revitalizing broken communities, increasing federal funding
on welfare, and developing Medicare and Medicaid programs to assist
elderly and disabled patients and welfare recipients with medical
expenses.35 The Medicare and Medicaid programs offered health
care for the poorest Americans, thereby reducing infant mortality
rates and increasing life expectancy, particularly that of poor AfricanAmericans.36
Conservative politicians vigorously attacked welfare programs
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.37 Congress made its first major
effort to encourage work among single mothers in 1967, when it
allowed welfare recipients to retain part of their earnings.38 Since
1967, federal and state legislators have contrived sundry schemes for
moving single mothers “off the welfare rolls and onto payrolls.”39
These included job training programs and low-income housing.40
Despite these efforts, the number of welfare recipients doubled
between 1960 and 1974.41

33. See generally id. (discussing the history of the AFDC, and focusing largely on
the “problem” of single parent households and broken homes).
34. See TANNER, supra note 16, at 52-54 (outlining some of the programs enacted
under President Johnson’s “Great Society” initiative, including the Job Corps and the
Neighborhood Youth Corps).
35. See id. at 52 (stating that Medicare, Head Start, Legal Services, Community
Action grants, and Medicare were programs enacted by President Johnson as part of a
“War on Poverty”).
36. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOWS OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 265 (1986) (describing the “modest revolution in health care”
perpetuated by Medicaid and Medicare programs, which reduced the infant mortality
by half in some areas and dramatically increased life expectancy).
37. See generally CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 105-20 (1997) (describing the conservative backlash
against welfare programs that existed in the 1960s and 1970s).
38. See TANNER, supra note 16, at 113 (describing the Work Incentive (“WIN”)
Program, introduced in 1967, which required that all welfare recipients except those
with special exemptions be placed in jobs or training programs).
39. See JENCKS, supra note 4, at 166.
40. See, e.g., id. at 52 (discussing President Johnson’s enactment of the Housing
and Urban Development Act, which authorized the construction of 600,000 federally
subsidized low income housing units to assist the poor).
41. See id. at 266 (stating that in 1960, 7.1 million people received public
assistance; by 1974, that number had increased to 14.4 million).
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During the 1970s, most Americans viewed welfare recipients,
particularly black mothers on welfare, as undeserving.42 Perhaps no
other politician effectively, yet controversially, built public resentment
against social welfare programs like Ronald Reagan. During his bid
for the 1976 presidential election, Reagan told a story about an
African American woman from Chicago who was arrested for welfare
fraud. According to Reagan, the woman had eighty aliases, thirty
different addresses, twelve Social Security cards, four deceased
husbands, and collected benefits under each name along with
Medicaid and food stamps.43 The term “welfare queen” originated
from Reagan’s inaccurate portrayal of welfare recipients as lazy
African-American women with values and morals contradicting those
of working and middle class Americans.
Despite several plans to reduce government spending on welfare,
the poverty rate grew at levels much faster than employment
opportunities for welfare recipients. The proportion of single
mothers with paid jobs rose only from fifty-two percent to fifty-seven
percent between 1960 and 1988.44 Welfare recipients grew from
147,000 families in 1936 to nearly five million families in 1994.45 To
put this in perspective, less than one percent of all U.S. families with
children received welfare benefits in 1936, but by 1994, this
percentage had ballooned to fifteen percent. In 1994, approximately
ten million children, or fifteen percent of U.S. children, were
beneficiaries of AFDC while more than twenty-two percent of U.S.
children lived in poverty.46
The Family Support Act of 1988 required all states to develop a Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (“JOBS”) to move
families off welfare to self-sufficiency.47 The purpose of JOBS was to
42. See NOBLE, supra note 37, at 114 (discussing the role that race played in
making many Americans view welfare recipients as undeserving “shirkers”).
43. See Franklin G. Gilliam, Jr., The Welfare Queen Experiment: How Viewers
React to Images of African-American Mothers on Welfare, 53 NIEMAN REP. 49 (1999)
(discussing the “intersection of race and gender” as a narrative script successfully
employed by President Reagan to create negative images of the welfare program),
available at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/99-2NRsummer99/Gilliam.
html.
44. See JENCKS, supra note 4, at 166.
45. See Douglas J. Besharov & Peter Germanis, Welfare Reform—Four Years
Later, 140 PUB. INT. 17, 17-35 (2000) (acknowledging the growth in the number of
welfare recipients).
46. See Morton S. Baratz & Sammis B. White, Childfare: A New Direction for
Welfare Reform, 33 URB. STUD. 1935, 1936 (1996) (noting the importance of having
AFDC function correctly because of the vast numbers of poor children in the United
States).
47. See Carol Dawn Peterson, Female-Headed Families on AFDC: Who Leaves
Welfare Quickly and Who Doesn’t, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 619, 624 (1995) (stating that the
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provide working age AFDC recipients with skills, education, and work
experience to enhance their chances of obtaining and maintaining a
job.48 This program was not successful because states were not
required to serve all AFDC recipients and failed to receive upfront
support from the federal government.49
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”)50 converted AFDC from a federal
entitlement program to a program of fixed block grants administered
by the states.51 This fixed block program, known as the TANF
program, emphasizes work requirements and limitations on welfare
benefits.52 TANF recipients receive transitional assistance conditional
on work or the performance of work-related activities.53 Federal
legislation has two broad requirements for TANF recipients: (1) all
recipients must go to work within two years of entering the program
and (2) all recipients have a five-year lifetime assistance limit.54
However, states may enforce shorter time limits on assistance.55

JOBS program was designed to help welfare families become more self sufficient by
increasing their “employability”).
48. See Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New
Workfare, 9 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 19, 20-22 (1998) (explaining how regulations on
salary and benefits entoned these requirements).
49. See id. (citing the fact that federal funding for JOBS programs was only on a
matching basis as one of the reasons for the program’s failure).
50. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (governing the type of aid given and how the
administration of that aid should be evaluated).
51. See Diller, supra note 48, at 24-25 (detailing the implications of the work
requirements under PRWORA).
52. See Paul Davies et al., The Effect of Welfare Reform on SSA’s Disability
Program: Design of Policy Evaluation and Early Evidence, 63 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 3-11
(2000) (discussing the effects that the policy changes in TANF will have on recipients
of SSI and SSDI); see also Robert Haveman & Barbara Wolfe, Covering the 1996
Reform Law–Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Its Objectives, 87
THE QUILL 35, 35-38 (1999) (outlining the ways that TANF differs from AFDC).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1996) (setting out the work requirements mandated by
TANF).
54. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (1996) (stating that no individual may
receive assistance for longer than sixty months). See generally Ladonna Pavetti &
Nancy Wemmerus, From Welfare Check to Paycheck: Creating a New Social Contract,
20 J. LAB. RES. 517 (1999) (using Virginia as an example of the development and
implementation of a welfare to work program); Wendy Chavkin et al., State Welfare
Reform Policies and Declines in Health Insurance, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 900, 900-08
(2000) (exploring the implications of TANF policy on Medicaid enrollment and
health insurance coverage).
55. See Janice Peterson, Welfare Reform and Inequality: The TANF and UI
Programs, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 517, 518 (2000) (stating that twenty states have already
implemented shorter time limits for receiving TANF benefits).
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II. TANF POLICIES
A. Welfare to Work
TANF replaced the work requirements of the Family Support Act of
1988 (“FSA”) and effectively changed the philosophy behind work
requirements.56 The FSA emphasized the matching of welfare
recipients’ skills with the needs of the job market to get them off and
keep them off the welfare rolls,57 whereas TANF’s primary focus is
simply to get welfare recipients to work and off of welfare.58 FSA
targeted the long-term employability of welfare recipients while TANF
focuses on removing recipients off welfare rolls by mandating lifetime
assistance limitations and promoting the idea that any employment
should be accepted regardless of lack of benefits or opportunities.
Not all welfare recipients are required to work to be eligible for
TANF assistance. TANF has created three exemptions to the sixtymonth rule: (1) the minor child exemption,59 (2) hardship
exemption,60 and (3) Native American or Native Alaskan
exemption.61 These exemptions have a minuscule effect on the
number of needy families affected by TANF.62 The minor child
exemption affects only the minor child who is not the head of a
household or married to the head of a household.63 In other words,
a minor child who is currently a dependent is granted a separate sixtymonth period if that minor child becomes a head of household. This
might force an impregnated minor to move out of the parent’s home
or to give up parental rights to the baby because the sixty-month
56. See Diller, supra note 48, at 23 (explaining that the underlying philosophy of
the FSA work requirement “reflected a presumption in favor of educational training
and placements [while] the PRWORA adopts a presumption against them”).
57. See id. at 20 (deducing that lack of job training and support kept people from
working).
58. See id. at 24-26 (describing the “shifting social messages” sent by the changes
in the work requirements).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(B) (1996) (exempting minor children who are not
household heads or married to a household head).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C) (1996) (allowing a family to be exempt from
the work requirement if a family member has been subject to extreme cruelty).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(D) (1996) (exempting adults who live in “Indian
Country” or Alaskan Native villages where there is an unemployment rate of fifty
percent or more).
62. See Montgomery L. Wilson, Congress Imposes an “Undue Burden” on Poor
Families: How the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act’s Full-Family Cut-Off Will Force
Parents to Separate from Children, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 141, 144-49
(1998) (arguing that these restrictions place an undue burden on families that do not
fall under any of these exemptions).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(B)(ii) (1996).
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period starts whether or not benefits are being received once a minor
child becomes a head of household.
The hardship exemption is for individuals who have “been battered
or subjected to extreme cruelty.”64 While TANF lists seven explicit
situations which give substance to “battered” and “extreme cruelty,”65
it also gives states broad latitude in determining what actually
constitutes “battered” or “extreme cruelty” by failing to make an
individual’s inclusion in one of the seven categories a mandatory
hardship exemption.66 Instead the state “may” exempt a family from
the sixty-month limitation benefits.67 This equivocal language gives
states the authority to set any hardship criterion that is within the
federal parameters.
TANF has been successful in reducing welfare caseloads. The
number of welfare caseloads has been reduced forty to fifty percent.68
Wisconsin and Wyoming have reduced their welfare caseloads by
nearly ninety percent.69 A study at the Center for Civic Innovations,
completed in July 2001,70 indicates that dramatic changes have
occurred in the welfare and work environment due to the policy
changes made in TANF.71 Results show that welfare reform, not the
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i) (1996).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii)(I)-(VII) (1996). The statute defines a
battered individual as:
[one who] has been subjected to (I) physical acts that resulted in, or
threatened to result in, physical injury to the individual; (II) sexual abuse;
(III) sexual activity involving a dependent child; (IV) being forced as the
caretaker relative of a dependent child to engage in nonconsensual sexual
acts or activities; (V) threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse;
(VI) mental abuse; or (VII) neglect or deprivation of medical care.
Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i) (1996) (“The State may exempt a family from the
application of subparagraph (A) by reason of hardship or if the family includes an
individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.”) (emphasis
added).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(ii) (1996) (allowing the state to make
determinations with respect to limitations).
68. See Besharov & Germanis, supra note 45 (stating that by June of 1999, the
welfare rolls had fallen forty-nine percent from their all time high in March 1994);
see also Chavkin et al., supra note 54, at 906 (discussing the impact of the changes in
TANF policy on Medicaid enrollment).
69. See Alexander Nguyen, Help Wanted: Why Welfare Reform Needs Good
Social Workers, 32 WASH. MONTHLY 17, 17-20 (2000) (discussing the possibilities of
using social workers to help TANF recipients find and keep jobs, and asserting that
the decline in the number of welfare cases is not necessarily indicative of successful
welfare reform).
70. See generally O’Neill & Hill, supra note 27 (exploring the history and impacts
of welfare reform).
71. See, e.g., id. at 5-12 (showing significant declines in welfare participation and
increases in work participation among different demographic groups as a result of
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booming economy, was the major factor for the change in the work
participation patterns of welfare enrollees.72 In fact, the upswing in
the economy accounted for less than twenty percent of the increased
participation.73
1. Accountability of Contractors
Over the past ten to fifteen years there has been a fundamental shift
in the delivery of social services.74 Local governments are increasingly
contracting with private concerns to deliver social services, and this
trend is escalating with TANF.75 The broad and general mandate of
the federal government to the state governments allows both state and
local governments to invest private companies with the power to
conduct intake and make eligibility determinations for welfare
recipients.76
Many administrative procedure acts or public
information laws do not pertain to private concerns because a
contractual relationship between the government and private
concerns does not transform the private concern into a public
agency.77 However, because of the sixty-month limitation of benefits,
it is imperative that any entity involved in the process of transitioning
welfare recipients off of welfare rolls is accountable for promoting or

welfare reform).
72. See id. at 25 (concluding that the increased work rates and decreased reliance
on welfare was due to the passage of welfare reform acts).
73. See id. at 21 (attributing the progress in welfare reform to policy changes
rather than a changing economy).
74. See Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and
Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services,
28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1559, 1561-65 (asserting that the Welfare State has become the
Contractual State with many private concerns providing the social services that had
been historically provided by government, but without the rigorous oversight
mechanisms inherent in government agencies).
75. See id. at 1561 (discussing the upward trend in the privatization of social
services).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1996) (allowing the state to use the TANF grant “in
any manner that is reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of” TANF or in
any manner that was authorized by the repealed AFDC); see also Bezdek, supra note
74, at 1566 (outlining the background of privatization of government services and its
implication for welfare).
77. See Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185-87 (1980) (stating that documents
created by a private concern, which is a federal grantee, may be autonomous); see
also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the
Department of Health and Human Services satisfied the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act when it did not follow the Act’s notice and comment
procedures for rulemaking when issuing directives and entering into contracts with
private hospitals); Bezdek, supra note 74, at 1568-72 (discussing the application of
administrative laws and procedures to private concerns in the context of government
contracts).
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administering programs that will prepare the recipients for a
successful exodus.
2. Welfare Recipients as Employees
The Center for Civic Innovations produced a study that revealed an
increase in work participation patterns regardless of marital status,
age, education or race.78 The most significant gains were by young
single mothers with children, black and Hispanic women, high school
dropouts, and unmarried mothers.79 Another study at the Institute
for Research on Poverty completed in August 200180 asserts that over
five-sixths of the welfare recipients who entered the workplace under
TANF were considered equal to or better than the typical employee in
comparable positions.81 Employers of former welfare recipients also
seem to be satisfied. A phone survey of 600 employers representing
the Welfare to Work Partnership found that most former welfare
recipients are paid more than federal minimum wage, receive pay
raises at an equivalent rate to other workers, and stay on the job
longer than other employees.82 These findings help to dispel the
perception that welfare participants are shiftless and unwilling to
work.
This above average work record has developed despite the
numerous employment obstacles for TANF recipients. According to
one study, forty-four percent of TANF recipients identified at least two
major obstacles to work. Lack of education, no work experience, lack
of childcare and transportation, language barriers, and mental and
physical problems were among the most popular deterrents to
working.83 Several incidents of child abuse and neglect, child
stockpiling, low wages to caregivers, and federal fund
78. See O’Neill & Hill, supra note 27, at 6-15 (showing increases in work in nearly
every demographic group surveyed).
79. See id. (reporting on the groups that have been the most successful in leaving
the welfare rolls).
80. See generally Harry J. Holzer et al., Job Performance and Retention among
Welfare Recipients, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/pubs/dp123701.pdf.
81. See id. at 13 (reporting that one-third of the welfare recipient-workers studied
were considered better than average, and only one-sixth were considered to be worse
than other employees).
82. See HR Focus, Survey Says Welfare-to-Work Program is a Success 8 (2000)
(reporting that sixty-two percent of companies said that retention rates for employees
on welfare were better than for other employees, and that the average starting wage
for working welfare recipients was forty-six percent higher than the federal minimum
wage at that time).
83. See Wendell Primus, What Next for Welfare Reform?, 19 THE BROOKINGS REV.
16, 16-19 (2001).
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misappropriations exist at daycare centers that service welfare
recipients seeking employment.84 Even when welfare recipients find
work, they experience additional problems. Compared to mothers
receiving TANF benefits, working single mothers experience greater
economic hardships as their work-related expenses outweigh the
increased income from going to work.85 Most welfare recipients
cannot afford suitable childcare, yet there are still more than a dozen
states that do not guarantee a childcare program for current TANF
recipients who are in education or training.86
Problems with health insurance coverage are also prevalent.
Creators of the 1996 welfare reform policies acknowledged that
women who left TANF were unlikely to find employment with health
insurance benefits.87 Compared to other social classes, poor families
are less likely to have advanced education, more likely to be employed
part-time or work at jobs without fringe benefits, and have higher
rates of infant mortality and diseases.88 Single parent female
households that do not receive welfare have, on average, incomes
more than double that of similar households receiving welfare
benefits.89 As a result of higher discretionary income, single parent
female households that do not receive welfare can afford to spend
approximately five times more on health coverage and three times
more on childcare than similar households receiving welfare
benefits.90

84. See Andrew Goldstein, It Took Three Dead Babies, TIME, July 10, 2000, at 8081 (describing some of the current problems with daycare).
85. See generally KATHRYN EDIN & LARUA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW WAGE WORK (1997) (detailing the plight of
single mothers on welfare or in low-paying jobs).
86. See State Policy Documentation Project, Findings in Brief: Childcare
Assistance (stating that only thirty-five states provide child care assistance to families
who are in education or training, and that often there is an additional work
requirement), available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/childcare/childcaresumm.htm
(last visited June 17, 2003).
87. See generally Chavkin, supra note 54 (exploring possible connections
between TANF policy changes, Medicaid participation, and health insurance coverage
in general).
88. RICHARD T. SCHAEFER, SOCIOLOGY 208-09 (1986).
89. See Becca Newman & Deanna L. Sharpe, How Much Is Enough: Feasibility of
Welfare to Work for Single Mothers, 45 CONSUMER INT. ANN. 15, 15-20 (1999).
90. Id.
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3. Livable Wage
Acquiring a job is one thing, living on the wages produced by the
job may be another thing altogether.91 It is critical that the job
recipients under TANF’s welfare-to-work plan receive a livable wage.92
A recent study showed that persons who left the AFDC program
(TANF’s predecessor) for more than one year are no better off than
persons who left the AFDC program for less than one year.93 While
TANF caseloads have dropped from 4.8% of the U.S. population in
1996 to 2.1% in June of 2000,94 success of TANF cannot be measured
in decreased TANF rolls alone.95
The living wage is important because now that a sixty-month
limitation has been placed on the cumulative term of any person on
welfare, people cannot go on and off of welfare intermittently and
indefinitely as has been the usual case of low-income welfare work
placements.96 A recent study in Washington State indicates that the
amount of income a welfare recipient earns on the recipient’s first job
after leaving the welfare system has a significant relationship to job
91. See Cynthia Negrey et al., Job Training Under Welfare Reform: Opportunities
for and Obstacles to Economic Self-Sufficiency Among Low-Income Women, 7 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 347, 348 (2000) (stating that traditionally female jobs tend to pay
low wages and therefore are unlikely to bring women and their families to economic
self-sufficiency).
92. See PEACE & JUSTICE CENTER, PHASE 1: BASIC NEEDS AND A LIVABLE WAGE, THE
VERMONT JOB GAP STUDY (Jan. 1997) (defining a living wage as the hourly rate/annual
income necessary to cover basic needs plus all relevant federal and state taxes),
available at http://www.epinet.org/Issueguides/poverty/budgetbystate.html; see also
NORTHWEST POLICY CENTER, NORTHWEST JOB GAP STUDY (2001) (defining a living wage
as one that allows a family to meet its basic needs without resorting to public
assistance and provides them with some ability to deal with emergencies and plan
ahead), available at http://depts.washington.edu/npc/npcpdfs/Region.pdf.
93. See Heather Boushey & Bethney Gunderson, Briefing Paper: When Work Just
Isn’t Enough: Measuring Hardships Faced by Families After Moving from Welfare to
Work, ECON. POL’Y INST. 16 (June 2001) (measuring four categories for critical and
serious hardships (food insecurity, housing problems, insufficient access to health
care, and inadequate child care) for recent and long-term AFDC program departers),
available at http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/hardshipsbp.pdf.
94. See Administration for Children and Families, Statistics: Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Percent of Total U.S. Population, 1960-1999,
ACF NEWS (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/news/stats/
6097rf.htm.
95. See Negrey et al., supra note 91, at 348-49 (discussing the unique situation of
women on TANF, and the effects of mandatory work requirements on women); see
also Boushey & Gunderson, supra note 93, at 1 (asserting that employment rates and
poverty levels of former welfare recipients do not provide a complete picture of the
families’ well-being).
96. See Rebecca Brown et al., Working Out of Poverty: Employment Retention
and Career Advancement for Welfare Recipients, NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES 5-6
(July 1998) (describing the work patterns of women on welfare), available at http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/news/welfare/poverty/cover.htm.
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retention.97 For example, of the welfare participants who entered the
job market with hourly wages of $9.50 or more, sixty-seven percent
continued to be absent from the welfare rolls thirty-six months later.
However for those who entered the job market with hourly wages of
$6.50 or less, only thirty-two percent remained off welfare after thirtysix months.98 Another Washington state study in 1996 reported that
approximately forty percent of the jobs in Washington paid less than a
livable wage for a single person and seventy-two percent paid less than
a livable wage for a single adult with two children.99 The Washington
state study followed a Vermont study that used 1995 data and showed
that thirty-six percent of jobs in Vermont paid less than a livable wage
for a single person and seventy-eight percent paid less than a livable
wage for a single adult with two children.100
The reduction in welfare caseloads may be misleading. For
example, the state of Idaho has been successful in reducing welfare
caseloads by eighty-nine percent, but has only spent $12 million of its
$55 million TANF budget on job training and childcare.101 Not all
states experience a significant reduction in welfare caseloads. From
1994 to 1998, Rhode Island and Hawaii achieved less than a twenty
percent reduction in welfare caseloads while the number of welfare
caseloads increased in Guam and the Virgin Islands.102
Time limits may cause another distortion in the decrease in welfare
caseloads. Under AFDC, poor single-parent families with at least one

97. See Russell M. Lidman, The Family Income Study and Washington’s Welfare
Population: A Comprehensive Review, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y 10 (Oct.
1995), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/hlthwelfare/pdf/fisreview.pdf.
98. See id. (showing that the correlation of job retention to starting wage held at
starting wages between $9.50 and $6.50). Sixty-one percent of the welfare recipients
who had starting wages between $8.00 and $9.50 and forty percent of those with
starting wages between $7.99 and $6.50 were still off welfare after thirty-six months.
Id.
99. See NORTHWEST POLICY CENTER, supra note 92, at 12 (stating that “in
Washington, 41 percent of job openings pay less than the $10.25 an hour living wage
for a single adult and 72 percent pay less than the $16.86 an hour living wage for a
single adult with two children”).
100. See Peace & Justice Center, Phase 2: Livable Wage Jobs: The Jobs Gap, THE
VERMONT JOB GAP STUDY 12, Table 4 (May 1997), available at http://www.epinet.org/
Issueguides/poverty/budgetbystate.html.
101. See Robert Kuttner, The States Are Ending Welfare As We Know It— But Not
Poverty, BUS. WK. 36 (June 12, 2000) (arguing that Idaho’s policy is simply to “clear
the rolls” while other state provide a combination of work and learning that helps
people become more self sufficient).
102. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: EFFECTS OF DECLINING WELFARE
CASELOADS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE, APPENDIX I (June 1999), available at http://
www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99105.pdf.
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child under eighteen years of age could receive assistance without
time restrictions. TANF policy has a lifetime aid limit of sixty months
or five years.103 While a single parent with a youngest child in the
teen years would have no incentive to leave welfare under the AFDC
program given that welfare benefits would cease upon the child’s
eighteenth birthday, single parents with younger children may save
their benefits until a later time under TANF’s lifetime entitlement
guidelines.104 Therefore, it is possible that the reduction in welfare
caseloads is overstated since some former welfare recipients may not
have exhausted their lifetime assistance.
States have an opportunity to keep many of the welfare recipients
with remaining eligibility from returning to welfare rolls by addressing
livable wages. One of the primary reasons many welfare recipients
return to welfare is because they can receive more income from
welfare payments than from the low-wage jobs for which they usually
qualify.105 Since research indicates a correlation between low wages
and welfare recidivism, the recidivism rate could be significantly
reduced by an increase in the pay for those entering the job
market.106 Although some researchers have accused the federal
government of failing to provide adequate financial support for
welfare recipients,107 increasing educational and job training
opportunities for welfare participants would likely yield more
favorable results than raising the minimum wage by itself.
Advancement through education and training, unfortunately, can
only be accomplished in TANF by vocational training because only
vocational training is counted toward the work requirement and then
only for up to twelve months for each individual.108

103. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A) (1996).
104. See Gene Koretz, Saving Benefits for a Rainy Day, BUS. WK. 44 (Dec. 27, 1999)
(discussing a study that illustrated the strategic use of time-limited welfare benefits).
105. Laura Cohn, From Welfare to Worsefare?, BUS. WK. 103-04 (Oct. 9, 2000)
(discussing the fact that many former welfare recipients are in a worse financial
situation after leaving the welfare rolls and finding work due to the extremely low
wages paid by many jobs).
106. See Brown et al., supra note 96, at 24-30 (outlining various ways that workers
coming off of welfare can increase their wages and advancement potential, thus
limiting welfare recidivism); see also Lidman, supra note 97, at 10 (showing a link
between increased wage rates and remaining off of welfare).
107. See Andrew S. Gruber, Promoting Long-term Self-sufficiency for Welfare
Recipients: Post-secondary Education and the Welfare Work Requirement, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 247, 248 (1998) (promoting the need to include post-secondary education as
meeting the work requirement in order to allow those who can to advance through
higher education).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1996).
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4. Education
TANF takes the posture that any work will lead a welfare recipient
to long-term sufficiency. Advancement through higher education has
been given less significance because college education does not count
toward an individual’s work requirement.109
III. CHALLENGES IN MISSISSIPPI: PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS OF TANF
POLICY
A. Single Mothers
Unlike most states, Mississippi is burdened with a combination of
teenage pregnancy, economic disparity, illiteracy, and unskilled labor.
Mississippi has the highest percentage of live births to mothers less
than twenty years of age in the United States.110 This is an alarming
statistic since single mothers and their children represent the largest
proportion of welfare recipients and people in poverty.111 Studies
suggest that young women, regardless of race, who conceive out-ofwedlock children or raise them without a husband are most likely to
have deleterious life outcomes.112 The offspring of single parent
households are likely to be dependent upon welfare, thus the cycle of
poverty is likely to persist from generation to generation.
Mississippi’s TANF policy penalizes welfare mothers with additional
children. The contention is that welfare mothers should not be
rewarded for having more children when they are struggling to care
for the ones they already have. However, one may argue that the
poor have the same rights and freedoms guaranteed to other citizens.
Newborn children cannot care for themselves and, by failing to
provide financial support, Mississippi’s TANF policy is punishing both
the parent and the child. While the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the right to copulate and produce offspring is
protected by the Constitution,113 there is no constitutional right for
109. See id. (stating that vocational training is counted toward work, but only for
twelve months for any individual); see also Gruber, supra note 107, at 254-55 (arguing
that “the exclusion of post-secondary education as an activity that counts toward a
state’s aggregate work participation rate undermine one of welfare reform’s primary
purposes: to give states more flexibility in operating their welfare programs.”).
110. See Sally C. Curtin & Joyce A. Martin, Births: Preliminary Data for 1999,
48(14) NAT. VITAL STAT. REP. 12 (Aug. 8, 2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs48_14.pdf.
111. See generally Newman & Sharpe, supra note 89.
112. DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 109-33 (1996).
113. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down legislation that
imposed sterilization on “habitual criminals” as unconstitutional). See generally
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the government to bear the expense of that personal decision. TANF
cannot prohibit reproduction even if individuals are incapable of
supporting their offspring,114 but TANF does not promote such
reproductions either.
Among all states, Mississippi has one of the highest infant mortality
rates,115 second highest poverty rate,116 and a significant percentage
of households participating in the food stamp program.117 Mississippi
also ranks last in per capita income, per capita disposable income, and
median household income.118 Despite these disparaging figures,
Mississippi trailed only Idaho, Wisconsin, and Wyoming in total
percentage decrease (fifty-nine percent) of TANF enrollment between
1996 and 1998.119
B. Livable Wage in Mississippi
The maximum gross income limit for a family of four to be eligible
for TANF benefits is $819 per month, or $9828 per year.120 This
estimates to $5 per hour assuming an individual works forty hours per
week for fifty weeks with unpaid vacations. Assuming that a family of
four is eligible for the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit of $144

Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Constitutional Review of Privacy—Invading
Welfare Reforms: Distinguishing the Abortion-Funding Cases and Redeeming the
Undue-Burden Test, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing the constitutionality of
personal reproduction choices).
114. See Marcia Smith, Cuts and Class, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 27, 1998 (noting that
the federal government has admitted to funding projects to sterilize 100,000 to
200,000 poor women in 1972).
115. See T.J. Matthews et al., Infant Mortality Statistics from the 1999 Period
Linked Birth/Infant Death Data Set, 50(4) NAT. VITAL STAT. REP. 10 (Jan. 30, 2002)
(showing that Mississippi’s infant mortality rate is second only to that of the District of
Columbia).
116. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE ESTIMATES FOR PEOPLE OF ALL AGES IN POVERTY
FOR US: 1999 (estimating that approximately 18.2% of people in Mississippi live in
poverty), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/stcty/a99_00.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
117. See Randy Rosso, Characteristics of Food Stamp Households Fiscal Year 2001
65 (showing that 1.6% of Mississippi residents receive food stamps), available at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/OANE/MENU/published/FSP/FILES/Participation/2001
CharReport.pdf (last visited June 17, 2003).
118. See Netstate.com, States Ranked by Income Statistics, available at
http://www.netstate.com/states/tables/st_income.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2003).
119. See Chavkin, supra note 54, at 902.
120. See State Policy Documentation Project, Financial Eligibility Rules for TANF
Cash Assistance, Mississippi, available at http://www.spdp.org/compstates/msfinan.
pdf (last visited June 17, 2003).
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per month in Mississippi,121 its total yearly gross income is
significantly less than the poverty threshold for a family of four.122
Families in Mississippi participating in the TANF program face
severe exchange restrictions, since they fall well below the poverty
threshold. A family of four earning the maximum gross income and
TANF cash benefits allowable in Mississippi is $3500 below the poverty
threshold. These families are representative of poor consumers in the
exchange restrictions model.123 Exchange restrictions are limitations
of consumer access to goods and services because consumers either
lack the availability or financial resources to acquire them.124 Strict
exchange restrictions limit the choices of poor consumers on
necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, transportation, utilities and
health care.125 The hopelessness produced by this loss of control over
their life circumstances then leads to the development of coping
strategies, including unreported “cash” jobs, loans and grants to
attend school, and cash from family, friends, or churches.126 Since
welfare recipients are likely to face deterrents to work due to a lack of
education, childcare, and transportation, the likelihood that TANF
eligible families in Mississippi with a head of household working fulltime is low. Low-income families with the head of household earning
minimum wage have few opportunities to earn significant incomes.
C. Education in Mississippi
TANF policy in Mississippi does not provide enough support to
minor teen parents living with non-relatives or individuals who desire
higher education. A minor teen parent may not receive benefits if he
or she lives with a non-relative because of overcrowding, alcohol or
drug abuse, or concern for abuse at the home of the teen parent’s

121. Id.
122. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS IN 2000 BY SIZE OF FAMILY AND
NUMBER OF RELATED CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS (Sept. 20, 2000) (showing that the
federal poverty level for a family of four is $17,524), available at http://www.census.
gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh00.html.
123. See Ronald Paul Hill, Stalking the Poverty Consumer: A Retrospective
Examination of Modern Ethical Dilemmas, J. BUS. ETHICS (May 2002) (illustrating
that there is an imbalance of power in marketing exchange relationships between
businesses and poor consumers), available at http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/
pagana/mg312/consumer.html.
124. Id. (suggesting that many poor consumers enter into unfavorable exchange
relationships such as rent-to-own contracts because it is the only way that they have
access to things that they want to own).
125. Id. (stating that health care expenditures decrease as income decreases).
126. Id. (describing various coping mechanisms used by the poor when faced with
an income shortfall).
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caretaker(s).127 Such environments are stressful and potentially
dangerous not only for the parent but for the child as well. Minor
teen parents on the TANF program do not receive monetary rewards
or incentives for graduating from high school or obtaining a GED.128
The state’s TANF policy also does not allow a postsecondary degree
program to substitute for work mandates.129
One of the most troublesome concerns facing Mississippi is its
illiteracy rate. Mississippi ranks worst among the fifty states in adult
illiteracy.130 The National Institute for Literacy (NIL) conducted a
study called the National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS). NALS
grouped 26,000 participants into five literacy levels with the two most
serious being Levels I and II. Level I is comprised of adults who are
completely or functionally illiterate.
Adults in Level II are
characterized as those with eighth grade reading levels and work at
jobs that require minimal skills and abilities. Thirty percent of adults
in Mississippi are categorized as Level I and nearly seventy percent
have literacy rates in Levels I or II.131 This is important because Level
I adults usually cannot read applications so they are likely to
experience problems when applying for assistance or meeting
employment requirements under the current policy.
IV. RECOMMENDED CHANGES
In order for TANF policy to work in Mississippi, we present several
recommendations. Additional state funding is needed to bring poor
working TANF households in Mississippi up to at least the poverty
income level determined by the U.S. Census Bureau. In some
Mississippi communities, the number of TANF participants is
projected to be more than double the number of available jobs.132
127. See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND
TANF, TEENS AND TANF, MISSISSIPPI 2 (providing information about eligibility of
minor teen parents for TANF), available at http://www.spdp.org/compstates/
msrepro.pdf (last visited June 17, 2003).
128. See id. at 5-7 (outlining TANF eligibility and educational requirements for
minor teen parents).
129. See State Policy Documentation Project, Work Requirements: Postsecondary
Education as of October 1999 (stating that an individual cannot meet the work
requirement by participating in a tow or four year degree program), available at
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/postsecondary.PDF.
130. See Larry Roberts, Illiteracy on the Rise in America, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB
SITE (Oct. 14, 1998), available at http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/oct1998/ill-o14.
shtml.
131. Id.
132. Frank M. Howell, Prospects to Job-Matching in the Welfare-to-Work
Transition: Labor Market Capacity for Sustaining the Absorption of Mississippi’s
TANF Recipients, Paper Presented at the Rural Dimensions of Welfare Reform: A
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Additional employment partnerships and training programs are
needed in economically destitute counties.
Single welfare mothers with children encounter difficulties in
working full-time because their income prospects are mediocre at best
and childcare represents a large portion of their expenditures. More
than a dozen states, including Mississippi, do not guarantee childcare
for TANF recipients as of June 2000.133 Childcare and nursery
programs should be state supported for TANF recipients who actively
seek work or are currently working.
As of October 1999, individuals could meet the state work
requirement by participating in two-year and four-year degree
programs in thirty-nine and thirty states, respectively. Mississippi does
not allow postsecondary education to substitute for the work
requirement under the TANF program.134 Educational opportunities
are essential if TANF policy is to be effective. Under the current
TANF policy, most welfare recipients are forced to work menial jobs
because they lack job skills, education, and resources to obtain higher
paying jobs. Allowing postsecondary education to substitute for TANF
work requirements would empower welfare recipients, particularly
single mothers, and increase their opportunities for meaningful
employment, job advancement, and competitive wages. For example,
Washington State provides free tuition to welfare recipients who sign
up for community college programs that integrate work and
learning.135 Mississippi should implement a similar plan among its
community colleges, universities, and trade/vocational schools.
One alternative to supplement Mississippi’s TANF funding is to
implement a repayment program for welfare recipients who find jobs
after completing our proposed postsecondary education initiative.
TANF aid would resemble an interest-free loan with a grace period.
Five-year lifetime benefits would roll over into an emergency relief
fund for former welfare recipients who pay back their loans within a
set time period. This would provide a safety net for former welfare
Research Conference on Poverty, Welfare and Food Assistance, Georgetown
University Conference Center, Washington, DC (May 4-5, 2000), available at http://
www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/Howell_rural.pdf (last visited August 12, 2003).
133. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, TANF FINANCIAL DATA, Table A2 (illustrating that the Mississippi TANF
program spent zero dollars on child care in fiscal year 2001), available at http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofs/data/tableA2_summary.html (last visited June 17, 2003).
134. State Policy Documentation Project, Work Requirements: Postsecondary
Education, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/postsecondary.pdf (last visited
June 17, 2003).
135. See Kuttner, supra note 101, at 36 (stating that the state of Washington
provides free tuition for post-secondary education to welfare recipients).
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recipients in times of recession, employment layoffs, or family
hardships. The key to the plan is to provide a combination of
education and job experience thus enabling welfare recipients to
become self-sufficient and independent from TANF aid in the future.
A mandatory literacy test for current and prospective members of
the TANF program is also needed. Due to the high illiteracy rates in
Mississippi, the TANF program should identify adults with Level I and
Level II literacy skills and offer remedial or GED classes. Such a
program would uplift the uneducated, provide hope and a sense of
accomplishment to welfare recipients, and instill pride and a stronger
work ethic in the family. To encourage higher education among
welfare recipients in Mississippi, teen mothers on welfare should
receive financial incentives for completing high school and more for
attending college.
CONCLUSION
Most sociologists and social program supporters argue that society
and government should shoulder some responsibility to care for the
poor. Unfortunately for welfare recipients, welfare reform policies
have operated under the idea of “less eligibility,” which suggests that
poor people should have a standard of living below that of minimum
wage workers and thus resources should be allocated accordingly.136
Conservatives have argued that the benefits from AFDC and other
antipoverty programs perpetuate social problems such as an increase
in out-of-wedlock births and a reduction in both the attractiveness of
low-wage employment to the poor and the appeal of marriage to poor
women.137 Liberals have argued that additional spending is needed
to bridge the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. Poverty
seems to be negatively correlated with educational achievement.
Workers without a high school diploma received an average monthly
income of $452 while those with a college degree earn an average of
$1829.138 Merely having a job does not improve living conditions of
former and current welfare recipients. Only one-fourth of all adults
who left welfare for jobs reported incomes above $15,000 in 1998.139
136. Ronald Paul Hill & Debra Lynn Stephens, Impoverished Consumers and
Consumer Behavior: The Case of AFDC Mothers, 17(2) J. OF MACROMARKETING 32
(Fall 1997).
137. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 219 (1993).
138. See Roberts, supra note 130 (noting the vast difference in incomes based on
education).
139. Off Welfare, Not Faring So Well, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2000, at 37
(discussing the hardships faced by many people leaving the welfare system).
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TANF policy in America is complicated given that there are more
than fifty versions of state and county welfare reform. Federal and
state TANF programs should be revised to better serve the need of the
poor. We suggest that legislators amend TANF policies by supporting
childcare and nursery programs for TANF recipients currently
working or actively seeking work, making literacy programs available
to all recipients, allowing education to substitute for the work
requirement, and establishing an incentive program for minor teen
parents who finish high school or college. Finally, additional state
funding is needed to provide a standard of living that at least meets
the poverty income level for working TANF recipients.
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